Category Archives: Pro Se

REVENGE OF THE DAD: WRIT OF MANDAMUS & HABEAS CORPUS FOR RETURN OF MY CHILDREN

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Boston Tea Party

PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES,

(PURSUANT: NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, et seq.

PURSUANT: BINDIN COMMON-LAW inclusive of Haines v. Kerner (1972)

&

WRIT OF MANDAMUS, IN LIEU OF WRIT, LEGAL BRIEF

WRIT OF HAEBEAS CORPUS, FOR BENJAMIN AND VANESSA SYPHRETT

(Submitted in Forma Pauperis, by Indigent Citizen, (See Proofs in Dockets: FV-03-1154-14 & FO-11-131-13)

Magnify Glass FACTS

SEE FULL PETITION TO SUPREME COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, COURT CLERK

WITH EXHIBITS DETAILING SOME OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HERE:

2014-10-12 Petition – Writs – Legal Brief

 Legal Papers

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCE

(Pursuant: New Jersey State Constitution Article I, Par. 18;

Pursuant: Haines v. Kerner U.S. Supreme Court 1972; &

Binding Common-Law within this Jurisdiction)

 

 

Derek C. Syphrett, Esq. 10/10/2014

In the following capacities, and as the following legal persons:

Attorney; Citizen of New Jersey; Citizen of the United States of America; The Sovereign Power / Authority, in parte et in lege, et in lege; Permanently Disabled Person; Real Party of Interest; Defendant Pro Se; The Public, in parte; Naturalis Homo In Carne; Amicas Curiae; Witness-of-fact; Parent & Legal Guardian of Benjamin & Vanessa Syphrett (Citizens of Connecticut, and victims of Parental Kidnapping in 2010, in putative court ordered custody of Margaret Wallace, by putative court order of the State of New Jersey);

252 Fountayne Ln,

Lawrence Township, NJ 08648

VIA U.S. MAIL & FACSIMILE BY THIRD PARTY PERSONS

M. Smith, Hon. Chief Justice Rabner, Hon. Justice Albin, and all Employees of the New Jersey Courts with: any connection to my legal affairs: praeterita vel praesentia

Supreme Court of New Jersey

25 Market St, Trenton, NJ 08625

RE:

  1. THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NEW JERSEY COURTS;
  1. WRITTEN REQUEST FOR ACCOMODATION PURSUANT THE FEDERAL AMERICAN’S WITH DISABILITIES ACT (A.D.A. / ADA)
  2. THE ADDRESSEES OF THIS LETTER WILL BE IN VERY BIG LEGAL TROUBLE IF I DO NOT GET ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS AND DEMANDS IN 7-DAYS. THE GIG IS UP. MY PATIENCE HAS EXPIRED. NO PERSON ON EARTH WOULD PUT UP WITH WHAT I HAVE IN SUCH A CIVIL AND LAWFUL MANNER, AND YET I REMAIN CIVIL & LAWFUL AND I SHALL REMAIN SO AT ALL TIMES. YOU MAY BE SUBJECTED TO DIRECT OR COLLATERAL PROSECUTION IF THE OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IS NOT BOTH “CURED” AND “PURGED” REMEDIALLY

 

Dear Michelle M. Smith, Hon. Chief Justice Rabner, Hon. Justice Albin, Judge Glenn Grant, J.A.D. And all officers of the Unified Courts of New Jersey, Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct:

I have sent this letter to you in all of your “official capacities”, whether they be administrative or judicial in nature, or otherwise.

In my aforementioned legal capacities, and on behalf of the multitude of legal persons I both represent, and, in fact, am: I must at this point propound upon my (in parte) Court the following concerns and requests pursuant the interest of Justice, Court Rule 1:33, New Jersey State Constitution, 1947, Constitution for the United States of America, 1787 (inclusive of subsequent Amendments), the American Common-law / constitutionally operable portions of the ius civilli, within this states jurisidiction, and pursuant the A.D.A.:

 

PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES,

PURSUANT: NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, et seq.

&

WRIT OF MANDAMUS, IN LIEU OF WRIT, LEGAL BRIEF

WRIT OF HAEBEAS CORPUS, FOR BENJAMIN AND VANESSA SYPHRETT

 

Lady Justice Soldier

 

  1. I demand by operation of the Common-Law of this Jurisdiction, and pursuant timely and properly filed Writ of Coram Nobis, in Lieu of Writ, and papers submitted by right pursuant Court Rule 4:50, that my legal matters in Vincinage 3 be immediately relocated to an appropriate court.

    1. TO BE CLEAR: I demand (pursuant my prior and present written notices (in toto) which detail violations of “THE LAW” with relation to my legal affairs that the Administrative Office of the Courts consider Intervening in a material and impactful manner, in the interest of Justice; AND in support of my constitutionally protected rights; AND the RULES-OF-LAW (eg. Court Rules in toto)) THE COURT RESPOND IN WRITING TO ADDRESS THE VIOLATIONS OF COURT OFFICERS JUDGE PEDRO JIMENEZ, JUDGE FITZPATRICK, JUDGE JACOBSON, JUDGE BOOKBINDER, JOHN TOMASELLO, ETC.
    2. TO BE CLEAR: BY COURT RULE (1:33 and others) IT IS NOT THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCTS SOLE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURTS. IT IS IN FACT THAT OF CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, in his administrative capacity, and it is further the delegated responsibility of the Director of The Courts, and all Assignment Judges.
    3. AS SUCH: I DEMAND THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURTS WITH REGARD TO MY LEGAL AFFAIRS AND THE APPARENT NULL & VOID COURT ORDERS CURRENTLY PROPOUNDED UPON MY PERSON(S) AND MY PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE-PROCESS UNDER-THE-LAW, AND WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN THE LAW.

  2. I DEMAND THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CASE FILES IN FM-03-790-14, FV-03-1154-14, FV-03-1162-14, AND PROSECUTOR’S CASE # 13-2502, in toto, and inclusive of the Transcripts for the Same.

  3. I DEMAND THE COURT EXPLAIN UPON WHAT LAWFUL AUTHORITY I WAS ARRESTED ON 8/19/2013, AND THEN ARRAIGNED BY JUDGE PEDRO JIMENEZ WITHOUT ANY LEGAL NOTICE TO MY ATTORNEY (MYSELF), OR MYSELF (DEFENDANT), PRIOR TO BEING HANDCUFFED AND BROUGHT BEFORE A JUDGE ON 8/19/2013 1-DAY PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED “FIRST APPEARANCE”, WHICH WAS SERVED UPON ME ON 8/18/2013.

    1. FURTHER I DEMAND TO KNOW: ON WHAT BASIS IN FACT MY WARRANT OF 8/18/2013 WAS AMENDED, AS THE COURT, PROSECUTOR, AND SHERIFF’S OFFICE HAVE TO DATE NOT SUPPLIED ANY ANSWER TO MY WRITTEN REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION.
      1. In Fact in June of 2014: The Sheriff’s Office Falsely Claimed that they had no record of my 8/19/2013” arrest in response to the O.P.R.A. Request of John Paff. THIS WAS AN ACT OF MAIL FRAUD AND A LIE.
      2. THE AFOREMENTIONED LIES / FALSE STATEMENTS WERE: ONLY CORRECTED AFTER A COPY OF THE ARREST RECORD WAS SENT TO THE MERCER COUNTY OFFICE OF COUNSEL!!!
    2. FURTHER I DEMAND TO KNOW: ON WHAT LAWFUL AUTHORITY I WAS ARRESTED WITHIN THE SUPERIOR COURT WHILE SERVING AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FOR A CASE PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AT THAT TIME AND/OR
    3. I DEMAND TO KNOW ON WHAT AUTHORITY WAS I ARRESTED ON 8/19/2013, AFTER LAWFULLY POSTING BAIL ON 8/18/2013 IN PROSECUTORS CASE #13-2502

  4. I DEMAND THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS FROM (dsyphrett@gmail.com) TO EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT AND EMPLOYEES OF THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT FROM (1/2013 to 10/12/2014):

    1. The Court Acknowledge written receipt, via “mail”, of my objection to the Probation Departments enforcement of a “Null & Void” child support order, and the courts / probatins failure to schedule an Administrative Hearing on the disputed facts of the matter.
    2. The court acknowledge my pre-adjudication requests in both FM-03-790-14 and FV-03-1154-14 (via an un-scheduled, Immediate Appeal requesting counsel be assigned): that I repeatedly requested counsel as a indigent, and as a result of my documented disabilities. THE COURT FAILED TO HEAR MY PROPERLY PLACED MOTIONS, AND/OR FAILED TO EVEN ISSUE SUMMONS FOR THE 3/1/2014 IMMEDIATE APPEAL (this was a violation of State Statutory-due-process, the will of the People, and contrary to the New Jersey State Legislature’s Authority, to demand the court provide immediate appeals as of right to a D.V. Defendant)!!!
    3. The Court Acknowledge that the proceedings in FM-03-790-14, were in fact and/or law in violation of the rights of the real parties of interest (Derek Syphrett, Benjamin Syphrett, and Vanessa Syphrett), in the manners described in the past correspondence with The Court, A.C.J.C. Sent via various forms of “mail” to the Court, and contained in the motion papers of Mr. Syphrett. This includes:
      1. THESE FACTS, EVIDENCE, AND TRANSCRIPTS CONFIRMING THAT: THE COURT PROHIBITING A WITNESS OF FACT, THE DEFENDANT, AND THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY (Derek Syphrett) FROM APPEARING AT TRIAL IN FM-03-790-14, FV-03-1162-14, AND FV-03-1154-14, on 2/18/2014 and 2/19/2014, where the court in some cases adjudicated the matters ex-parte, as a result of prohibiting one litigant from appearing at all, via court orders of 2/6/2014, and 2/19/2014.THE AFOREMENTIONED BASIS IN FACTS AND EVIDENCE (AND THE OTHER EVIDENCE I HAVE SENT TO THE COURT PREVIOUSLY) REPRESENTS: CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THIS COURT HAS PARTICIPATED IN IUNLAWFUL ACTS, THAT ARE REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS STATE, AND AS A RESULT AFFORDS THE COURT NO OFFICE, TO ISSUE FINAL ORDERS IN ANY OF THESE MATTERS BY OPERATION OF THE COMMON-LAW.
      2. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS SUPPORTING THIS DEMAND AND/OR LEGAL ARGUMENT INCLUDE: “LAW OF THE VOIDS” AND/OR “DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCALS”
        1. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

        Excerpts from “The Valley Supreme Court:

        “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”

        1. Boyd v. United 116 U.S. 616 : Justice Bradley said: “It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens…”
        2. Gomillion v. Lightfoot 364 U.S. 155:“Constitutional Rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied.”
        3. Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425:An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
        4. In Marbury v. Madison, U.S. Supreme Court: Chief Justice John Marshall stated:“the very purpose of the written constitution is to ensure that the government officials, including Judges, do not depart from the documents fundamental principles”.
        5. RE: THE DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCALS: This Court has attempted to order Mr. Syphrett to pay child support for children that the State placed in the Physical & Legal Custody of Margaret J. Wallace, THIS VIOLATES “THE DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCALS”, AND EXCLUSIVE OF THE VIOLATIONS OF MR. SYPHRETT’S RIGHTS AT TRIAL, THIS COURT HAS FURTHER COMPOUNDED ITS ERRORS BY ASSERTING THAT MR. SYPHRETT IS OBLIGATED TO PAY CHILD-SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN THAT THE COURT HAS PUTATIVELY ASSERTED ARE NOT HIS CHILDREN UNDER-THE-LAW, OR WITHIN THE PHYSICAL / NATURAL WORLD. FURTHER:FURTHER: THIS UNIFIED COURT HAS ASSERTED THAT MR. SYPHRETT IS OBLIGATED TO SUPPORT THE SAME CHILDREN THAT THE COURT ASSERTS ARE NO LONGER HIS TO RAISE, REAR, OR PARENT IN THE MANNER HE SEES FIT AS A PARENT.

          FURTHER:

          Mr. Syphrett Cited “RE: The Matter of Baby “M”” during the trial proceedins in FM-03-790-14, for judicial notice. He explicitly demanded the court to acknowledge that it would be waiving the right to set an so-called “child-support” obligation if the court prohibited Mr. Syphrett from having legal and physical custody of his children. The court was effectively executing a quasi-adoption, and as such Mr. Syphrett would have no obligation to pay “support” to any party.

AS SUCH: THIS UNIFIED COURT IS WITHOUT ANY LAWFUL RIGHT TO DEMAND OR PURPORT THAT MR. SYPHRETT HAS ANY “SUPPORT” OBLIGATION TO MS. WALLACE, OR THE CHILDREN, AS IT VIOLATES THE DOCTRIN OF RECIPROCALS

I DEMAND THIS COURT ENFORCE MY LEGAL RIGHTS IN ALL OF MY AFOREMENTIONED CAPACITIES, OR ACCEPT LIABILITY FOR ITS FAILURE TO DO SO, AND THAT ALL COURT OFFICERS WHO HAVE FAILED TO ENFORCE MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS EITHER TAKE IMMEDIATE REMEDIAL ACTION, OR ALSO AVAIL THEMSELVES TO PROSECUTION IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF LAW.

 

 

I DEMAND A WRITTEN RESPONSE, INCLUSIVE OF WAIVORS OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FOR THOSE OFFICERS WHO VOLUNTARILY VIOLATED MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ANY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CASES, FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUCH WAIVOR, WILL BE DEEMED AS A THREAT AGAINST MY PERSON, AND PROOF, THAT SUCH OFFICERS INTEND TO FURTHE HARM ME AT A FUTURE DATE

 

 

I DEMAND THIS COURT PROVIDE ME THE NAME AND ALL OTHER APPROPRIATE INFORMATION PURSUANT THE ADA WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON RESPONSIBILE FOR ADMINISTERING THE “AMERICAN’S WITH DISABILITIES ACT” AT THE HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX, THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, WITHIN THE APPELLATE DIVISION, AND WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS. I DEMAND THIS INFORMATION AS A PERMANENTLY DISABLED PERSON, PURSUANT THE RECORDS CONFIRMING THE SAME PREVIOUSLY SENT TO THE UNIFIED COURTS OF NEW JERSEY.

 

I DEMAND PROBATION CEASE / STAY ANY ENFORCEMENT OF MY SO-CALLED “CHILD SUPPORT” COURT ORDERS UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT AND THE COURT PROVIDE ME A FOUNDATION IN THE LAW FOR THE SAME, THAT IS NOT CLEARLY THE RESULT OF NULL & VOID COURT ORDERS, WHICH WERE NULL & VOID AB INITIO (for the reasons cited herein, and for the reasons previously submitted to the Court and/or probation in writing).

I RESERVE THE RIGHT TO FURTHER PROSECUTE THIS MATTER AND ALL RELATED PERSONS, IN THE EVENT THAT MY GRIEVANCES ARE NOT FULLY ADDRESSED BY THE ADDRESSED PERSONS AND GOVERNMENTAL BODIES.

I DEMAND RESTORATION OF MY PARENTAL RIGHTS, MY CUSTODY RIGHTS, AND MY LEGAL RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO MY CHILDREN BENJAMIN AND VANESSA SYPHRETT. I DEMAND THIS SUA SPONTE, AND IMMEDIATELY

  1. BASIS IN FACT INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ORDERED A CHANGE OF CUSTODY BASED ON FACTS, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY NEVER PUT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT (1. Therapists in Connecticut, who did not appear in court, submit reports, or affadavits AND 2. witnesses whom the court did not allow the Defendant to Cross-Examine, the Defendant’s wife! AND 3. Witnesses the court refused to allow the Defendant to produce, his children!)
  2. BASIS IN FACTS AND THE LAW:
    1. THE DEFENDANT WAS NEVER PROVEN TO BE AN UNFIT PERSON TO A CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD OF EVIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE-PROCESS AT TRIAL.
    2. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO APPEAR AT HIS OWN TRIAL, AS WAS HIS ATTORNEY, AND HIS WITNESS-OF-FACT. THIS IS EXTRINSIC FRAUD! (See the current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary for “Extrinsic Fraud”)

 

 

iii. AS A PRESUMED FIT PARENT, WITH ONLY POSITIVE PARENTING TIME SUPERVISOR REPORTS THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF PURSUANT:

 

 

–  In Parham v. J.R. et al 442 U.S. 584 (1979) in toto, inclusive of cited cases, and specifically with regard to its findings that:

The Supreme Court declared the ‘best interest of the child’ resides in the fit parent – not in the state: “Our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is a “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.”

– Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) in toto and specifically with regard to its legal findings that:

To deny a parental right requires constitutional due process that proves he’s either unfit or a clear danger to his children – proven with ‘clear and convincing’ evidence. As such, Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) emphasized to restrict a fundamental right of a parent to any extent, requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence that serious harm will come to the child.

 

I ADVISE THAT: I WILL ONLY CONSENT TO THE PERMENANT SEALING OF MY FILES IN THE EVENT:THAT MY CUSTODY IS RESTORED AND THIS COURT WAIVE ALL FUTURE JURISDICTION OR RIGHTS TO INTERFERE IN THE RIGHTS OF MY PARENTAL RIGHTS SO LONG AS MY CHILDREN REMAIN CITIZENS OF A FOREIGN STATE

King Crown

CONCLUSION:

YOU WILL OBEY THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY /PARTY,

MEANING: ME (in parte / in toto)

 

I DEMAND THAT THIS PETITION BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY PURSUANT BINDING OPERATION OF THE COMMON-LAW, AS CITED IN HAINES V. KERNER, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1972), AND ITS BINDNG PROGENCY WITHIN THIS JURISDICTION.

FURTHER: I submit that to the extent that this document IN FACT DOES NOT ADDRESS ALL OF MY LONG-DATED CONCERNS PREVIOUSLY PUT BEFORE THIS BODY, I RESERVE AND DEMAND THE RIGHT TO BE FULLY HEARD, PLENARY PROCEEDINGS, AND ORAL ARGUMENTS… BECAUSE THIS COURT WILL NOT PROPOUND A SILENT INJUSTICE UPON ONE OF ITS CITIZENS. AS SUCH I REMIND THIS COURT THAT AS A CITIZEN I AM IN FACT A MEMBER OF THE BODY THAT POCESSES THE SOVEREIGN-AUTHORITYOF THIS COURT,

I AM IN FACT AND LAW: A CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION MYSELF AS A “CITIZEN”.

 

VERY TRULY:

Derek C. Syphrett, Esq.

Attorney-in-Fact

Citizen of New Jersey

Citizen of the United States of America

Permanently Disabled Person, pursuant the ADA

Witnesss-of-Fact

Real-Party-of-Interest

The Sovereign-Power, in parte / in toto, in iure civili, et in carne

Naturalis Homo in Carne

Legally Competent Person, Pursuant:the findings and Precedential Law in Kyle v. Verona Green Acres, and its progency in New Jersey Courts

The Putative Pro Se

 

 

Serfs Dont fight back

SEE THE TRANSCRIPTS OF JUDGE PEDRO JIMENEZ

ACTING AS JUDGE, WITNESS-OF-FACT, PROSECUTOR,

IN JUST ONE EPISODE OF THIS UNMITIGATED DISASTER

HERE

THIS WAS AN UNLAWFUL KIDNAPPING OF AN ATTORNEY,

APPEARING IN COURT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE!

JUDGE PEDRO JIMENEZ ACTED BEYOND ALL AUTHORITY AND MAY NOW BE

ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED CIVILLY AND CRIMINALLY FOR THIS!

 

 

 

cropped-gadsen-flag1.jpg

(Gadsen Flag Circa 1775)

THE ABOVE PROVIDED TO:

 

REMIND NEW JERSEY PUBLIC OFFICIALS THAT:

SOME OF US HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THE REASONS

THIS STATE IS “SELF-GOVERNED”

THE END FOR AN UNLAWFUL JUDGE – It Looks Like This!

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LETTER TO ASSIGNMENT JUDGE RONALD E. BOOKBINDER

SENT AFTER HE ATTEMPTED TO PROHIBIT A DEFENDANT FROM:

APPEARING  IN COURT FOR HIS OWN TRIAL, VIA

UNLAWFUL COURT ORDERS

 

 

SEE THE FAXED LETTER AND FAX RECEIPTS TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT (A.C.J.C.)

ADMINISRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS (A.O.C.) AND THE SUPERIOR COURT HERE:

2014-10-10 – LTR to Bookbinder ACJC AOC Goodbye

10/10/2014

Derek C. Syphrett, Esq.

Pro se litigant (Defendant)

252 Fountayne Ln,

Lawrence Township, NJ 08648

VIA U.S. MAIL & FACSIMILE BY THIRD PARTY PERSONS

Family Division Clerk, Suasan Fortino, Judge Bookbinder, John Tomasello, John Call, Judge Covert, Sharyn Sherman, Law Clerks for the Judges named herein.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part (Burlington County)

49 Rancocas Rd

Mount Holly, NJ 08060

RE: Bischoff v. Syphrett

Docket No.: FV-03-1154-14 – DIQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES

 

 

Dear Judge Bookbinder:

I am writing the court (not you) to further propound upon the court my demands for justice, pursuant my right to petition my government for redress of grievances, as secured by the People of New Jersey, pursuant the New Jersey State Constitution of 1947, and pursuant my right to communicate in the interests of Justice as an attorney-in-fact (citation: Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207 (1995): see courts findings which provide legal foundation supporting my judicial litigation privileges)

I wanted to follow-up on the Status Conference of 10/7/2014, to address your offer to allow me to “Judge Shop” and choose to have the Judge of my choice hear my petitions for redress of grievances (my motions papers generally) with regard to FV-03-1154-14 (only).

Please be advised that I decline your request to participate in any form of “Judge Shopping”, because the offer and the concept itself is offensive and disrespectful to the courts, the litigants, the public trust, and the institution of the Superior Court itself.

 

deviljudge

SEE SOME OF THE UNLAWFUL, NULL & VOID COURT ORDERS HERE:

2014-02-06 and 2014-2-19 and 2014-3-10 COURT ORDERS BOOKBINDER

TO BE CLEAR:

 

My concern about either yourself or John Tomasello attempting to adjudicate my legal matters is borne from my desire to enforce litigant’s rights for the legal person(s) I represent (myself and all other legal persons that I, in fact, am). My concern is that both John Tomasello and yourself have ceased to be Neutral third parties in due to a multitude of actions each of you have voluntarily chosen to engage in, which are clearly contrary to the law, rules-of-law, the state constitution, the federal constitution, my civil rights, and the interests of justice generally. BOTH YOURSELF AND JOHN TOMASELLO ARE ALREADY DISQUALIFIED BY RULE FROM HEARING MY MATTERS PURSUANT THE JUDICIAL CANONS AND MANDATORILY BINDING COMMON-LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION (WHETHER IT BE JUDICIALLY NOTICED OR NOT).

I say the above because the facts, testimony, process, etc that is already before the court 100%, clearly and convincingly support my position that your offending court orders of: 2/6/2014, 2/19/2014, 4/1/2014, 9/12/2014, and others are in fact null and void.

 

 

Court Order Judge

AGAIN: I REQUEST YOU TAKE NOTICE OF THE COMMON-LAW IN TOTO, AND SPECIFICALLY INCLUSIVE OF THE DOCTRINE OF “THE LAW OF THE VOIDS”

    1. The common-law right to attack a court order that is null & void ab initio remains inviolate. As such I assert that the final order in FV-03-1154-14 is NULL & VOID ab inito. Further I assert the orders of Judge Bookbinder dated 2/6/2014, and 2/19/2014 are both Null & Void, and that they represent acts of extrinsic fraud, in that they purport to interfere with the appearance of a witness-of-fact (The Defendant). Such orders may be attacked at any time and are not time barred. They may be legally attacked directly at the trial court and/or collaterally in any court with jurisdiction over the matter.
    1. SEE THE FOLLOWING LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS SUPPORTING MY CHALLENGE TO THE FINAL COURT ORDER AS A CHALLENGE DIRECTED AT ANY AND ALL NULL & VOID COURT ORDERS AFFECTING MY LEGAL INTERESTS:
    1. The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. Take Judicial Notice of:

      1. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

      1. Excerpts from “The Valley Supreme Court:

“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”

      1. Boyd v. United 116 U.S. 616 : Justice Bradley said:

“It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens…”

      1. Gomillion v. Lightfoot 364 U.S. 155:

“Constitutional Rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied.”

 

      1. Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425:

“An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”

      1. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall stated:

“the very purpose of the written constitution is to ensure that the government officials, including Judges, do not depart from the documents fundamental principles”.

 

0001910cba29056841e3b2e8ca7f16074ab

CONCLUSION:

 

For some not fully transparent, but yet apparent reason: it appears that you and your colleagues have attempted to obstruct justice in an unlawful manner with regard to my legal affairs and my communications with the court and third parties.

THIS WAS A BAD IDEA (MEANING STUPID). I am not the sort of man who should be trifled with by people or persons who have financial assets or lifestyles they wish to maintain at the status quo. I say this not to threaten or scare you, but to emphasize my firm and appropriate position that I will endeavor in any and all civil and lawful manners to hold those who transgress my children, my property, or my rights fully accountable to the law, or at a minimal: I will always endeavor to ensure that those who violate my personal rights or those of my children will be forever discouraged from doing so EVER again, by standing up for my rights in a civil, lawful manner, pursuant the interests of Justice.

TO BE CLEAR: I am not an intolerable jerk, BUT I CAN BE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE… I CAN BE AS BIG OF A JERK AS THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE, AND I HAVE NO PROBLEM TAKING THAT POSITION IF/WHEN IT SERVES THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.

FURTHER:

The history of people who’ve doubted my legal skill, and/or my professional skill is a very sad story. They do not fair well generally, because ultimately my success leads to their downfall and scrutiny of their peers. I am a very thoughtful person, and so when I speak or interact with the court it is ALWAYS PURPOSEFUL AND DESIGNED TO CREATE JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND AN END RESULT THAT IS IN FACT AND LAW: JUST.

Please also take some solace in the fact that while you have offended me and my family in a very personal manner, my dispute with you is not “personal”. I don’t care about you, or your family, your thoughts, your dreams, your aspirations, your retirement, your occupation etc. It’s just not something I want to concern myself with.

In fact if it were not for your awful conduct as a Judge I believe I could enjoy pleasant conversation with you and a few cocktails at a local eatery. At times you can seem to be a fairly enjoyable personality. However, as a Judge in my matters, you are a distraction, intolerable, and you’ve violated the law. For these reasons alone – I can not abide you handling of my legal affairs a second longer (Please see my writ of coram Nobis for details of my concerns and my legal rights to banish you from this case).

FURTHER: IT HAS NEVER MADE SENSE FOR BOTH JOHN TOMASELLO AND FOR YOU TO CO-DEPENDENTLY SERVE AS TRIERS OF FACT IN FV-03-1154-14… IT OFFENDS ALL MANNER JUDICIAL INDPENDENCE TO HAVE TWO JUDGES ACTIVELY HEARING THE MATTER, WITHOUT BOTH BEING PRESENT TO HEAR PRESENTMENT OF FACTS, TESTIMONY, OR MOTION PAPERS!!!

LASTLY: MY OFFICIAL POSITION IS YOUR COURT ORDERS DO NOT EXIST:

Please be advised that Your Court Orders and those of John Tomasello in FV-03-1154-14, FM-03-790-14, FV-03-1162-14, LITERALLY DO NOT EXIST IN THE CORPUS JURIS (THE BODY OF LAW)

I officially provide you this letter as legal notice that the orders are null and void, the aforementioned court orders: confer no rights; it impose no duties; affords no protection; creates no office; they are in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed … THEY DO NOT EXIST TO ME. FURTHER I WILL NOT CONSENT TO FURTHER HEARINGS BEFORE YOU AS YOU ARE LAWFULLY DISQUALIFIED AS OF 2/6/2014, WHEN YOU ACTED SUA SPONTE AS AN ADVERSE PARTY TO THE DEFENDANT AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE BY IMPEDEING THE LEGAL PROCESS UNNECESSARILY AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW AS CITED IN MY WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS.

SO WITH THAT I SAY, HAVE A NICE LIFE AND BEGONE. IF I SEE YOU AGAIN I WILL MOST ASSUREDLY ARREST YOU AND PROSECUTE AS IS MY RIGHT IN NEW JERSEY UNDER THE LAW AND COURT RULE 1:21 et seq.

Kind regards,

Derek Syphrett

Pro se Defendant

P.S. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS VIA INTEROFFICE MAIL UPON THE UNIFIED COURTS RECEIPT OF THE THIS LETTER.

cc: Judge Glenn Grant

cc: Administraive Office of the Courts (Appropriate Person Overseeing the Compliance with the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act)

cc: Michelle Smith Clerk of the Court

cc: Chief Justice Rabner

cc: Justice Albin

cc: Plaintiff – Kathryn Bischoff (the woman who never refuted or replied to my pleadings that she lied to obtain a FRO, delivered via Court Clerk, pursuant DV Procedural Manual)

 

For more background on the UNLAWFUL ISSUES ENDURED BY THIS MAN IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT (FAMILY COURT) READ MR. SYPHRETT WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS HERE.

 

Note a Writ of Coram Nobis is a ancient common-law writ that has origins in Chancery Courts. The New Jersey Family Court is still a Chancery Court, sitting within a Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, as such it is totally appropriate to file a Writ of Coram Nobis as of a Common Law right to Demand the correction of court errors of fact. Further Pursuant Court Rule 4:50 it is our well-researched (non-legal opinion) that within 1-year of a FINAL JUDGEMENT,  a motion for NEW TRIAL may be appropriate if a litigants rights were violated through no fault of that litigant, and/or over that litigants objections to the same at trial.

 

SEE THE WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS HERE:

2014-10-07 – FV-03-1154-14 Derek Writ Coram Nobis

IT IS SCATHING AND HILARIOUSLY RUDE TO THE JUDGES WHO LIED!

(IT CONTAINS MANY GRAMMAR ERROS, AND WILL BE AMENDED)

 

 

 

PickPocket and Loose Women

…  AND  …

 

The End Loonie Toons

STATE OF NEW JERSEY COURTS – IGNORE SUPREME COURT RULINGS – UNLAWFULLY INTERFERE IN PARENTING TIME

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Crony King

 

BELOW IS SOME INFORMATION SUBMITTED TO THE WEBSITE BY A PERSON IN NEW JERSEY THAT COMPILED RESEARCH FOR THEIR OWN MOTION TO THE COURT.

ITS A FASCINATING SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT PROHIBIT NEW JERSEY COURTS FROM INTERFERING IN PARENTING TIME DECISIONS OF “FIT PARENTS”.

 

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED TO  THIS WEBSITE THAT:

1) Any Court that issues orders inviolate of these Supreme Court Decisions is violating parents Constitutionally Protected “Due Process Rights” and orders issued contrary to these decisions are legally null and void.

2) In practice I suspect the New Jersey Courts and the Bar Association will Continue to Ignore these U.S. Supreme Court Decisions because these decisions get in the way of bilking innocent families out of hundreds of thousands of dollars individually and billions of dollars collectively

 

 

 

 

U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

PROHIBITING “THE STATE” FROM

INTERFERING IN PARENTAL DECISIONS

 

Court Order Judge

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS CIRCULATING AMONG FAMILY RIGHTS ADVOCATES TODAY

WE HAVE REPUBLISHED IT HERE TO INCREASE THE DISTRIBUTION OF THIS FREE INFORMATION:

 

THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS COME ALSO FROM: HERE

 

    1. In Parham v. J.R. et al 442 U.S. 584 (1979) in toto, inclusive of cited cases, and specifically with regard to its findings that:

      • The Supreme Court declared the ‘best interest of the child’ resides in the fit parent – not in the state: “Our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is a “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.”

    2. Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) in toto and specifically with regard to its legal findings that:

      • To deny a parental right requires constitutional due process that proves he’s either unfit or a clear danger to his children – proven with ‘clear and convincing’ evidence. As such, Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) emphasized to restrict a fundamental right of a parent to any extent, requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence that serious harm will come to the child.

    3. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) in toto and with regard to the legal fact that the Supreme Court established the following:

      • ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.”

    1. Washington v.Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) in toto, including citations, and with regard to:

      • The right to Due Process includes a substantive component to the process that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301302 (1993).

 

… IF THE CITIZENS CAN NOT GET THE COURT TO ABIDE THE ABOVE LAWS, THEN:

WE SHOULD PREPARE TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

Serfs hoe

Note: We think it is worth filing / citing these cases with our motions now that we have reviewed them.  Why Not?  Can’t make things any worse with regard to our cases. What readers of this cite do with this information is an individual decisions, which we withhold any advisement concerning. This website is does not provide this information as legal advise nor do we have any certified legal expertise express/implied or otherwise.

COURT REFUSES TO RESPOND TO REQUEST FOR COMMON LAW ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS

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 COURT CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO REPLY TO

COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS REQUESTS

Justice GaggedCOURT WILL NOT EXPLAIN OR REPLY TO:

FALSE IMPRISONMENT ON 8/19/2013

COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS

REQUESTS FOR COURT ORDER CLARIFICATIONS

 

 

Here is the letter I just sent to the Administrative Office of the Court (AOC) and Judge Glenn Grant (Acting Director of the Courts – New Jersey) in response to his letter to me complaining about emails and my OPRA and Common-law-right-of-access request.

DOCUMENT HISTORY:

COURT’S LETTER REFUSING TO ANSWER: 2014-08-28 LTR from AOC Glenn Grant

MY LETTER DEMANDING ANSWERS: 2014-08-31- Ltrs to AOC Glenn Grant

 2014-08-07 TO 14 – LTRS – Biased Court

2014-08-10 – MERCER COUNTY COURT – SHERIFF ISSUES

2014-01-12 – THE LETTER PETITION- Chief Justice …

 

Kangaroo Court Judge

 

THE LETTER FROM NJ AOC

IS FULL OF SHENANIGANS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF FACTS

 

The letter from the AOC completely ignores the fact that in addition to the OPRA (open records / sunshine request) I sent to the Sheriff’s Office my prior letter to the court also contained a common-law right of access request.

Further: I had sent written letters via Postal Service to the Judges who mishandled my cases I asked for clarifications of orders over 10 months ago and nobody has responded.

I covered all of this in my reply letter.

I stood up for my right to petition the court / government via email as a litigation privilege and 1st Amendment Right. 

My right to do so is also likely covered by Article I of the New Jersey State Constitution of 1947 in paragraph 18 (right to petition the government for redress of grievances).

As such it is my position that given the separation of powers the court is powerless to control my right to petition the government as granted to me by the New Jersey Legislature. I do not believe the Judiciary can revoke a privilege provided to me by the Legislature without due-process under the law.

This is where I am at… I hope I can coerce a written reply to my long-dated requests to the court.

HERO JUDGE: JUSTICE ALBIN SUPPORTS: DV Defendant’s Right to Counsel

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Judge TRUTH IS NO DEFENSE

IF I WAS A POOR  PRO-SE I WOULD FILE THIS LEGAL ARGUMENT PRE-TRIAL TO GET A LAWYER FOR FREE

HERE IS HOW I WOULD DO IT:

(Dislaimer This is not Legal Advice. I am not A lawyer.

This is simply what I would do in if I was poor and was facing a false DV Charge)

1) I would copy and paste Justie Albin’s Legal Argument and submit it to the trial court pre-trial to get a free lawyer if I was poor

2) I would do this as an immediate appeal and caption it with the “pleading” ” 1)REQUEST FOR COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANT”, “2) REQUEST TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL DETAILS TO SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE TO CONFIRM MY INDENGENCY

3) i WOULD THEN INCLUDE A SHORT SUMMARY OF MY INCOME AND BANK ACCOUNT BALANCES UNDER THE TITLE “STATEMENT OF FACTS”, I WOULD STATE THAT I AM THE DEFENDANT IN A DV CASE.

4) I WOULD THEN INSERT A TITLE “LEGAL ARGUMENT” AND COPY AND PASTE JUSTICE ALBINS DISSENT BELOW AND USE IT AS MY LEGAL ARGUMENT.

I BELIEVE NEW JERSEY COURTS ARE READY TO EVOLVE

SEE LEGAL ARGUMENT BELOW

Lady Justice Soldier

 
 
 
 
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JUSTICE ALBINS 9 PAGE AUTHORITATIVE DISSENT
SUPPORTING INDIGENT / POOR PEOPLES RIGHT TO A LAWYER IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
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D.N. v. K.M. (

429 N.J. Super. 592,  2014)

From: C-808 September Term 2012
 
 

==============================

JUSTICE ALBIN

A REAL AMERICAN HERO (JUDGE)

(See Albins Dissent & Invitation for a Brave Pro Se to Set a Date at the N.J. Supreme Court)

==============================

Greatest American Hero
 MAJORITY OPINION  OF JUSTICES DID NOT GRANT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
 
THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE…
 
READ THE DISSENT BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT MEN NEED TO FILE
IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE LAW IN NJ:
 
 
SUMMARY OF MAJORITY OPINION
NJ SUPREME COURT:

(App. Div. 2013). Consistent with current law, the Appellate Division concluded that “the protections of due process do not require the appointment of counsel for indigents presenting or defending a private party’s civil domestic violence action.” Id. at 606.

The dissent recommends that the Court grant certification in this case and examine whether counsel should be appointed for indigent 1 citizens in civil proceedings under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The Act itself does not authorize appointment of counsel for the parties in a domestic violence action. In that regard, New Jersey is not alone.

Only one state provides for appointment of counsel for both parties under comparable civil domestic violence laws. See N.Y. CLS Fam. Ct. Act 262(a)(ii). Thus, without any statutory authority, a directive from this Court requiring appointment of counsel would rest on constitutional grounds. To be sure, such a ruling would affect thousands of cases annually.

 

For the last court year alone, from July 2012 through June 2013, there were approximately 15,800 hearings for final restraining orders, according to the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC).

 

The AOC estimates that the vast majority of plaintiffs and defendants in those hearings were not represented by counsel. By way of comparison, there were a total of about 1200 Madden1 appointments for the year, and roughly two-thirds of them were for contempt proceedings in domestic violence cases. In any event, this case is not a good vehicle to embark on a constitutional analysis of the issue presented because, based on the record before us, petitioner did not assert that she was 1 Madden v. Delran, 126 N.J. 591′

 

SUPREME COURT “PUNTS” BECAUSE:

DEFENDANT NEVER ASKED FOR FREE LAWYER

 

(2010). The panel observed that “[t]he record does not reflect that defendant ever sought the appointment of counsel prior to or during the adjudication of this domestic violence matter. Accordingly, in the present setting, the issue is purely academic.” Ibid. The same is true here.

The petition for certification is denied. See R. 2:12-4. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA, and JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in this per curiam opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY C-808 September Term 2012 072186 D.N., Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. K.M., Defendant-Respondent.

 

JUSTICE ALBIN WRITES A GREAT

DISSENTING OPINION FOR:

POOR DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DV CASES

 

Gavel Stopper

 

Today, my colleagues refuse to hear a case that raises significant questions about the fairness of our civil justice system — a case that meets every criterion for the grant of certification under our Court Rules. See R. 2:12-4. D.N. has filed a petition for review of D.N. v. K.M.,429 N.J. Super. 592

(App. Div. 2013), in which the Appellate Division held that an indigent defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel when prosecuted for violations of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (“Domestic Violence Act”), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.

That decision cuts against the grain of a long line of jurisprudence in New Jersey guaranteeing the right to counsel to impoverished defendants facing consequences of magnitude, even in civil cases.

 

The Appellate Division ruled that a poor defendant has no right to appointed counsel in a domestic violence case despite the enormity of consequences that flow from a violation of the Domestic Violence Act.

Thus, a defendant mother, who is found to have violated the Act, could lose custody of her children and possession of her house; could face crushing financial penalties and placement of her name on an offender registry, jeopardizing her ability to secure employment, credit and housing; and could forfeit her right to possess a firearm.

The loss of these rights and imposition of these penalties may occur on an unlevel playing field where an inarticulate defendant, ignorant of the law and courtroom procedures, is 2 prosecuted by a well-trained, skilled, and experienced attorney representing the opposing party. The issue before the Court is not “purely academic” as my colleagues contend. D.N. v. K.M., __ N.J. __, __ (slip op. at 3) (quoting Crespo v. Crespo,

408 N.J. Super. 25

, 45 (App. Div.

2009), aff’d o.b.,

201 N.J. 207

(2010)). My colleagues rely on Crespo, supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 45, a case in which the Appellate Division declined to address the issue of the right to appointed counsel in a domestic violence case. Unlike Crespo, here the Appellate Division decided the issue, and its ruling stands as the law of the State until this Court says otherwise. My colleagues cannot expect that an uncounseled defendant, such as D.N., would know to assert her right to appointed counsel in a domestic violence case. It was the obligation of the Family Court to advise her of that right, which did not happen here. Importantly, D.N. argued on appeal (when represented by counsel) that she was indigent and had the right to appointed counsel, and the Appellate Division addressed the issue in a published decision. I do not understand how my colleagues can say that “this case is not a good vehicle to embark on a constitutional analysis of the issue presented,” D.N., supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 2), when the issue was presented to and decided by the Appellate Division. 3 Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the landmark ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U.S.335,83 S. Ct. 7929 L. Ed. 2d 799

(1963), a case trumpeting the right to counsel for the indigent in criminal cases. After Gideon, this Court took a giant step forward — far ahead of other courts in the nation — to secure for the poor the opportunity for equal justice in courtrooms throughout this State. See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt,

58 N.J. 281(1971).

‘

The right to counsel is an essential attribute of a fair trial. The denial of this petition will surely disappoint those who expect this Court to remain at the forefront of ensuring a fair adversarial process for the poor who face serious consequences of magnitude in civil cases.

 

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For the reasons I have given and for those that follow, I respectfully dissent.

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Gavel Stopper

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I. In Rodriguez, supra, this Court held that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. at 295 (emphasis added). In Rodriguez, we recognized that, in our adversarial system, defendants untrained in the complexities of the law are disadvantaged and in no position to represent themselves. Ibid. Because the practicalities of life did not permit for “a universal rule for the assignment of 4 counsel to all indigent defendants,” we accepted that the denial of counsel “may be tolerable” in cases where litigants face no “serious consequence.” Ibid.

 

But we were unwilling to abide the denial of counsel to an indigent defendant who faced a “consequence of magnitude.” Ibid. In the wake of Rodriguez, the landscape of the law changed in New Jersey, and our Court Rules reflect this new reality.

 

Now, under Rule 7:3-2(b), if an indigent defendant is facing a “consequence of magnitude” in a municipal court case, he or she must be assigned a municipal public defender. In the municipal court setting, the potential imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, a period of license suspension, or even a monetary sanction of $750 or greater, each individually, constitutes a “consequence of magnitude” entitling a defendant to the appointment of counsel. Guidelines for Determination of Consequence of Magnitude, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix to Part VII at 2503 (2014). In deciding Rodriguez, we did not hinge our decision on the number of defendants who might be entitled to appointed counsel. We did not suggest that for defendants facing consequences of magnitude, the right to appointed counsel — and therefore the right to a fair trial — depended on a cost analysis. Had the United States Supreme Court taken the cost-analysis approach, Gideon would not be on the books today, nor would Rodriguez. My colleagues note in their per curiam opinion that “last court year alone, from July 2012 through June 2013, there were approximately 15,800 hearings for final 5 restraining orders, according to the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC).” D.N., supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 2).

 

However, during that same period, according to the AOC, our court system disposed of 35,641 driving-while-intoxicated cases, and in every one of those cases involving an indigent defendant, the right to appointed counsel was guaranteed. Our approach has not been that if too many indigent defendants require counsel, we will provide counsel to none. Appointed counsel, moreover, is provided to many thousands of criminal defendants, and to a multitude of defendants in civil cases, as is evident below.

 

II. An indigent defendant must be assigned counsel in civil cases if he is facing imprisonment for failure to pay child support, Pasqua v. Council,186 N.J. 127, 149 (2006); termination of parental rights, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.R.,192 N.J. 301, 306-07 (2007); tier classification for community-notification purposes in a Megan’s Law case, Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 31 (1995); involuntary civil commitment, In re S.L.,94 N.J. 128, 142 (1983); and contempt proceedings for violating a restraining order, State v. Ashford,374 N.J. Super. 332,337 (App. Div. 2004).

 

Yet, a defendant who is prosecuted for an act of domestic violence is not entitled to counsel even though he faces a host of consequences of magnitude,including:

  • an order expelling him from his  home, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(2);

  • barring him from having contact with his children, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(3)(b),

  • or suspending his custodial rights to his children, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(11);

  • compelling him to pay compensatory and punitive damages, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4),
  • or emergency monetary relief, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(10); seizing his firearms, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(16),

  • and suspending his right to own a firearm or retain a firearms permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b);

  • restraining him from entering places frequented by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family or household members, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(6);

  • requiring him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(b)(18), or professional counseling, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(5);

  • dispossessing him of an automobile, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(9), or a family animal, such as a dog, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(19);

  • mandating that he submit to fingerprinting, N.J.S.A. 53:1-15; placing his name on a central registry for domestic violence offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-34;

  • requiring him to report to the intake unit of the Family Court for monitoring, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(15), and imposing other restrictions on his liberty and property interests.

 

This catalogue underscores that “[t]he issuance of a final domestic violence restraining order ‘has serious consequences to the personal and professional lives of those who are found guilty of what the Legislature has characterized as a serious crime against society.’” Peterson v. Peterson,374 N.J. Super. 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Bresocnik v. Gallegos,367 N.J. Super. 178, 181 (App. Div. 2004)).

 

 

The inescapable reality is that a finding that one has committed an act of domestic violence, in addition to everything else, 7 brands that person as a “batterer.”

The stigma of that branding is recorded in the Domestic Violence Registry, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-34, and has far-reaching effects.

How can our jurisprudence reconcile the right of appointed counsel to a defendant facing a $750 fine or a one-day license suspension in municipal court with the denial of that right to a defendant who is facing much more serious consequences in Superior Court in a domestic violence case?

 

Yet, the appellate panel in this case held that “[t]he entry of a domestic violence [final restraining order], along with an order granting the additional relief available under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b, does not result in a ‘consequence of sufficient magnitude’ to warrant the mandatory appointment of counsel.” D.N., supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 604.

The appellate panel’s decision does not appear to reflect the holdings or the spirit of our jurisprudence.

In Pasqua, [THE CASE THAT GIVES “DEADBEAT DADS THE RIGHT TO COUNCIL IN CIVIL COURT] supra, we made clear that “[u]nder the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution, the right to counsel attaches even to proceedings in which a litigant is not facing incarceration.” 186 N.J. at 147. We acknowledged that “the adverse consequences of a particular civil proceeding can be as devastating as those resulting from the conviction of a crime.” Id. at 142.

 

The assistance of counsel is an indispensable component of the right to a fair trial in an adversarial proceeding. “A person of impoverished means caught within the tangle of our criminal or civil justice 8 system” who is facing a consequence of magnitude should have “the assistance of a trained and experienced lawyer.” See id. at 146.

In Pasqua, we could “find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court . . . would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not.” Id. at 149. What principled reason can be found to deny an indigent defendant, facing so many consequences of magnitude in a domestic violence case, the right to appointed counsel, when counsel is provided to a municipal court defendant who may be fined $750? Certainly, this is an issue worthy of review.

III. The petition before us meets every ground for certification under Rule 2:12-4.

The petition “presents a question of general public importance” that has not been settled by this Court, the appellate panel’s holding and reasoning “is in conflict with” decisions of this Court, and, last, it is in the “interest of justice” that this Court determine whether indigent citizens can be deprived of significant rights in a domestic violence hearing without the assistance of counsel. See R. 2:12-4.

 

With Gideon and Rodriguez as our guides, it is difficult to imagine a case presenting a more compelling issue for review: the 9 right of indigent defendants, who are facing calamity, to a fair shake in our civil justice system. I am not willing to turn away from this important issue.

 

Because I would grant certification, I respectfully dissent.

 

 

AMEN JUSTICE ALBIN!

THE SUPREME COURT MUST SOMEDAY

ADDRESS THIS ISSUE

Gavel Broken

IF I WERE POOR, AND I WERE  CHARGED WITH A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CHARGE. I WOULD:

  1. FILE AN “IMMEDIATE APPEAL” AND
  2. SUBMIT JUSTICE ALBINS ARGUMENT
  3. AND REQUEST A FREE LAWYER TO REPRESENT ME